As the title implies, this article asks what an adequate practical ethic is and what a hermeneutic of moral experience can mean for practical ethics. We will use some elements from Ricoeur’s work to examine our view critically and develop it further. We will ask how experience can be an object of hermeneutical study and how we can tie narrativity and normativity together.

Name der Zeitschrift: Nietzsche-Studien Jahrgang: 45 Heft: 1 Seiten: 143-157.

O presente artigo examina o conceito, o diagnóstico e o prognóstico feito por Nietzsche a respeito do niilismo europeu e sua história, e o analisa como uma das mais importantes de suas contribuições para a filosofia e a cultura de nosso tempo.

The articles in this book display the originality and creativity of Eros and Eris, and their important role in the history of our culture, particularly in the history of philosophy and its role in today's systematic philosophy. Although these contributions to a hermeneutical phenomenology in this compilation are organized in a linear-chronological order (treating Homer, Hesiod, Plato, Aristotle, Augustine, Bonaventure, Thomas Aquinas, Cusanus, Kant, Hegel, Schelling, Nietzsche, Husserl, Heidegger and Levinas), they all carry out their own hermeneutical movement in the (...) history of philosphy on the basis of a commitment with out life, here and now, and a thematic, professional interest. Among the contributors are: R. Bernasconi, J. Colette, J.F. Courtine, L. Dupré, Kl. Düsing, J. Greisch, J. Kockelmans, P.-J. Labarrière and G. Jarczyk, E. Levinas, Al. Lingis, J.-L. Marion, O. Pöggeler, W. Richardson, P. Ricoeur, J. Sallis, M. Theunissen and S. IJsseling. (shrink)

L'amicizia, secondo Nietzsche, richiede un tipo particolare di conoscenza di sé: quella che consente di nascondersi e che preserva dall'illusione che gli amici possano essere mai completamente trasparenti gli uni agli altri. Questo tipo di conoscenza di sé genera solitudine, che a sua volta suscita un desiderio di amicizia. Gli amici possono essere onesti tra di loro solo quando si consentono reciprocamente di nascondersi e ciò richiede un senso molto acuto della "misura e della medietà", come quello manifestato dal nobile.Friendship, (...) according to Nietzsche, is in need of a particular kind of self-knowledge: the kind that allows one to hide oneself and that prevents one from the illusion that friends could ever be completely open towards one another. This kind of self-knowledge causes solitude, which, in turn, causes a longing for friendship. Friends can only be honest to each other when they allow each other reciprocally their hiding. This demands a very sharp sense of "measure and middle", such as the noble presents it. (shrink)

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In den Jahren, aud denen WL stammt , legt Nietzsche ein beachtenswertes Interesse für Aristoteles' politische Philosophie an den Tag, und WL kann aus der Perspektive einer Passage der aristotelischen Politik gelesen werden. In beiden Texten geht es um Wahrheit, Moral und Gemeinschaft. Während Aristoteles zufolge der Mensch als Logos-Wesen wesentlich in einer politischen Gesellschaft lebt und somit sich vom Tier und vom Gott unterscheidet, such Nietzsche nach einer Figue, die beide - gegensätzlichen - Positionen in sich vereint. Der Philosoph, (...) den Nietzsche sucht und der er sein will, muss sich einerseits außerhalb Gemeinschaft stellen, von welcher er andererseits Teil sein muss, um sein Aufgabe erfüllen zu können. Er muss sowohl Gott als auch Tier sein. Dass Nietzsche diese Figur jetzt noch nicht findet, macht seinen Text 'unfertig' und erklärt vielleicht, dass er 'geheimgehalten' werden musste.During the years in which Nietzsche write his essay On Truth and Lies in a Nonmoral Sense , he seems to have paid a remarkable interest to Aristotle's political philosophy, and TL can be read against the background of a passage from Aristotle's Politics . Both texts concern the relationship between truth, morality, and society. While, according to Aristotle, the human being is, as a logos-being, essentially a political being and therefore to be distinguished from animals as well as from god, Nietzsche seems to be searching for a being which brings both - contradictory - positions together. The philosopher whom he searches for and tries to be, should on the one hand distance himself from society in which he, on the other hand, should participate in order to be able to fulfill his task. He should be god and animal at the same time. Nietzsche does not find this figure yet, which makes his text unfinished and perhaps explains why he had to keep it secret. (shrink)

When we, from a Nietzschean perspective, read through the history of philosophical thinking about friendship, we find that the idealization of friendship leads inevitably to the problem of nihilism. This confronts us with the question whether friendship is still possible under nihilistic conditions. Nietzsche himself claims on the one hand that in our nihilistic condition only something like friendship can save us, but on the other hand that friendship itself has been unmasked and has become impossible by these very conditions. (...) It seems we are struck in the nihilistic paradox of not being allowed to believe in the possibility of what we cannot do without. Literary imagination since the 19th century seems to make us even more skeptical. Maybe Beckett provides an illustration of a way out that fits well with Nietzsche’s claim that only “the most moderate, those who do not require any extreme articles of faith‘ will be able to cope with nihilism. We might extend this to a moderate concept of friendship: in an age in which the great ideal of friendship erodes together with all ideality, we can only survive as long as we know that we’re not alone. Maybe that’s friendship: no perfection, no virtuosity, no lofty ideal, but simply this: to know that one is not all alone. (shrink)

Is er een verschil tussen theologie en filosofie, en zo ja, waarin ligt dat verschil? Dat lijkt me de kern te zijn van de punten die Johan van der Hoeven als commentaar naar voren brengt in zijn zeer sympathieke bespreking van mijn bijdrage aan het cursusboek van de Open Universiteit. Ik zal proberen duidelijk te maken waarom ik denk dat dit de kern is, hoewel hij zelf een andere “hoofdvraag” lijkt te formuleren. Maar eerst twee opmerkingen vooraf.

Insofar as the notion of forgiveness stems from the Jewish and Christian traditions, it seems to point at something very extraordinary. Although Christianity recommends or even commissions forgiveness to everybody, it nevertheless seems to consist of something which is not humanly possible: how could one remember the evil committed , and at the same time not blame the one who committed it? By ultimately reserving the entitlement and ability to forgive to God, by describing human forgiveness as a theological virtue, (...) and by emphasizing the gratuitous or gracious character of forgiveness, this tradition seems most of all to show that forgiveness is generally speaking impossible. In this paper, this conception of forgiveness is presented with the help of Jacques Derrida. The question how this apparently impossibility nevertheless sometimes happens is first answered with the help of Thomas Aquinas. Against this background, the paper claims that a ‘secular’ interpretation of forgiveness is also possible, which does justice to its being humanly impossible. Such interpretation describes forgiveness as an intersubjective act. (shrink)

A amizade ainda é possível em condições niilistas? Kant e Nietzsche são fases importantes na história da idealização de amizade, o que inevitavelmente conduz ao problema do niilismo. O próprio Nietzsche afirma que, por um lado, apenas algo como a amizade pode nos salvar em nossa condição niilista mas que, por outro, precisamente a amizade foi desmascarada e se tornou impossível baseada nas mesmas condições. Parece que estamos presos no paradoxo niilista de não nos ser permitido acreditar na possibilidade do (...) que não podemos prescindir. A imaginação literária, desde o século XIX, parece nos tornar ainda mais céticos. Talvez Beckett forneça uma ilustração de uma maneira que se adapta bem à afirmação de Nietzsche de que apenas "os mais moderados, aqueles que não necessitam de quaisquer artigos extremos de fé", serão capazes de lidar com o niilismo. Is friendship still possible under nihilistic conditions? Kant and Nietzsche are important stages in the history of the idealization of friendship, which leads inevitably to the problem of nihilism. Nietzsche himself claims on the one hand that only something like friendship can save us in our nihilistic condition, but on the other hand that precisely friendship has been unmasked and become impossible by these very conditions. It seems we are struck in the nihilistic paradox of not being allowed to believe in the possibility of what we cannot do without. Literary imagination since the 19th century seems to make us even more skeptical. Maybe Beckett provides an illustration of a way out that fits well to Nietzsche's claim that only "the most moderate, those who do not require any extreme articles of faith" will be able to cope with nihilism. (shrink)

Aan het eind van Zur Genealogie der Moral kondigt Nietzsche aan dat hij later een boek zal schrijven over ‘de geschiedenis van het Europese nihilisme’ . Dat boek is er nooit gekomen, althans niet van Nietzsches hand. Het enige wat we hebben zijn de aantekeningen daarvoor in zijn nalatenschap. Een van die notities is het beroemde ‘Lenzer Heide Ontwerp’ , een tekst waaraan Nietzsche zelf de titel Het Europese nihilisme gaf.Nadat Nietzsche de winter van 1886/87 in Nice had doorgebracht, trok (...) hij in het voorjaar weer richting Zwitserland om zich voor de zomer in Sils Maria te vestigen. In Nice had hij juist Dostojevski ontdekt, van wie hij onder andere de Aantekeningen uit het ondergrondse las, een boek dat een zeer kritische psychologie van de nihilist bevat. Op zijn reis naar het Engadin bleef Nietzsche steken omdat het in het hooggebergte nog te koud was en de Julier-pas nog niet sneeuwvrij. Tijdens zijn gedwongen oponthoud in Lenzer Heide noteerde hij deze tekst, aan de hand waarvan we nu een paar elementen van Nietzsches analyse van het Europese nihilisme belichten. (shrink)

Nietzsches Philosophie ist ein hermeneutische. H.-G. Gadamer kennzeichnet die hermeneutik als ein parktische Philosophie. In diesem Aufsatz wird versucht Nietzsches Bedeutung für ein Hermeneutik als parktische Philosophie zu skizzieren an Hand einer Behandlung des Themas 'Scham' in seinen Schriften. Im ersten Teil wird die Entwicklung von Nietzsches Gebrauch des Begriffs 'Scham' verfolgt. im zweiten Teil werden die Ergbnisse gesammelt in einer Beschreibung von Nietzsches 'Hermenuetik der Scham'. Scham ist ein Form des praktischen Vorveständnis der Welt. Der Philosoph muss, Nietzsche zufolge, (...) einerseits 'schamlos unerschocken' sein, wird andererseits aber gekennzeichnet durch, 'Ehfurcht, Scham und Teif'. Zum Schluss wird den Underschied zwischen dieser und die gadamersche Hermeneutik angedeuter.Nietzsche's philosophy is hermeneutical. Hermeneutics is according to H.-G. Gadamer: practical philosophy. The article tries to explain Nietzsche's contribution to a hermeneutics as practical philosophy, by way of a discussion of the meaning of "shame" in his writings. In the first part the development of the concept of shame in Nietzsche's writings is outlined in four stages. In the second part the results of this overview are collected in a description of Nietzsche's hermenuetics of shame: shame is part of our practical preunderstanding of the world. The philosopher has, according to Nietzsche, to be 'fearlessly shameless' on the one hand, but is characterised by 'modesty [Scham] and delicate reverence' on the other. Hermeneutical consciousness can be characterised in terms of shame. (shrink)

When Nietzsche is called a radical philosopher, it is (among other reasons) because he claims to call into question what other thinkers take for granted. In the article I concentrate on the way in which Nietzsche asks his questions, and how his questions (and the vocabulary which he uses to express his questions) develop through his writings. The article points out how Nietzsche gradually discovers his guiding question and how this search reaches its climax around 1886. This guiding question turns (...) out to be a practical or existential one: ‘To what extent can truth endure incorporation?’ (FW/GC 110 KSA 3.471). Key-words: Question, task, Nietzsche’s development. (shrink)

There seems to be a pervasive trend towards public apologies, forms of national introspection, and appeals to grant forgiveness. Does 'forgiveness' enable a public or political use of the term? Is it possible to forgive on behalf of others, and if so, under what conditions? These conceptual questions are related to reflections on the cultural and religious contexts of expressing forgiveness. Do forgiving words promote a willingness to look ahead and prevent a relapse into conflicting views on the poisonous past? (...) Or do they bring along aversion? Maybe the 'push' towards forgiveness is experienced as highly unfair. Archbishop Tutu's motto that "there is no future without forgiveness" is well known. The South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission has become an important model and source of inspiration for many other countries that want to deal with their past grievances and internal conflicts. This book discusses the role of forgiveness within processes of peace building and transitional justice. (shrink)